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The Sales Tax Exemption for
Machinery for New and Expanded
Industry Applied to Coal Mining
After Amax Coal Company
INTRODUCTION
Kentucky imposes a sales tax on all retail sales made in the
state' and a use tax on all tangible personal property purchased
outside the state for use or consumption in the state, 2 unless
specifically exempt by statute.' Generally, mining equipment pur-
chased within or without the state for use in the state is subject
to the sales4 and use tax' under Kentucky's statutes. The exemp-
tion from the sales and use tax for machinery for new and
expanded industry6 is applicable to machinery used to extract
I Ky. REv. STAT. § 139.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter KRS with
all cites being to Michie/Bobbs-Merrill]. KRS § 139.200 provides:
mposition of sales tax - For the privilege of making "retail sales" or "sales
of retail," a tax is hereby imposed upon all retailers at the rate of five per
cent (507o) of the gross receipts of any retailer derived from "retail sales"
or "sales at retail" made within this commonwealth on and after April 1,
1968.
Id.
, KRS § 139.310 (1982), which provides:
Imposition of use tax - An excise tax is hereby imposed on the storage,
use or other consumpiton in the state of tangible personal property pur-
chased on and after April 1, 1968, for storage, use or other consumption
in this state at the rate of five per cent (5%) of the sales price of the
property.
Id.
, The Kentucky statutes exempt various products and transactions from the im-
positon of the sales and use tax. See KRS §§ 139.470, .472, .480, .482, .483, .485, .495,
.496, .500, .531(2) (1982).
4 See supra note 1.
I See supra note 2.
6 See KRS § 139.480(8) (1982). "[T~he terms 'sale at retail,' 'retail sale,' 'use,'
'storage,' and 'consumption,' as used in this chapter do not include the sale, use,
storage, or other consumption of . . . (8) [m]achinery for new and expanded industry."
Id.
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coal. 7 Less clear, however, are the types d.nd uses of mining
equipment that qualify for the exemption from the sales and use
tax. These questions have arisen because the statute as amended
defines the exemption inadequately in light of Kentucky's mining
control laws and in light of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, (SMCRA) which was enacted one
year after the amendment. 9 The statute defining the exemption
was amended in 197610 to include the extraction of coal within
the processing production process. This amendment was enacted
at a time when most mining equipment was used in the direct
extraction process and prior to the enactment of SMCRA.
SMCRA requires extensive use of mining equipment in mining
activities besides the direct extraction process.
This Comment will examine the statutory framework of the
sales and use tax as applied to the mining industry. First, the
Comment will examine the applicable statutes and the Kentucky
Supreme Court's recent decision in Revenue Cabinet, Com. v.
Amax Coal Co." to gain an understanding of the historical
development of the exemption for machinery for new and ex-
panded industry. To assist in the evaluation, the Comment will
examine the Revenue Cabinet's position as expressed in the case
law, and in the Cabinet's publications. Next, the Comment will
examine the court's decision in Amax Coal Co. in light of this
historical development. The Comment will conclude with a dis-
cussion of the impact of the Amax Coal Co. decision, which
greatly expanded the availability of the exemption for machinery
See KRS § 139.170 (1982), which provides:
"Machinery for new and expanded industry" shall mean that machinery
used directly in the manufacturing or processing production process, which
is incorporated for the first time into plant facilities established in this
state, and which does not replace machinery in such plants. The term
"processing production" shall include: the processing and packaging of
raw materials, in-process materials, and finished products; the processing
and packaging of farm and dairy products for sale; and the extraction of
minerals, ores, coal, clay, stone and natural gas.
Id.
I Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pua. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)) [hereinafter SMCRA].
1 1976 Ky. Acts Ch. 7, § I (Extraordinary Sess.).
10 Id.
-1 718 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1986).
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for new and expanded industry to the coal industry because all
machinery used in an integrated mining process now qualifies
for the exemption.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
In 1960, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted the statu-
tory framework imposing the sales and use tax, but allowed an
exemption for machinery for new and expanded industry. 12 The
statute defined the exemption in an ambiguous manner, as fol-
lows: "Machinery for new and expanded industry shall mean
that machinery used directly in the manufacturing process, which
is incorporated for the first time into plant facilities established
in this state, and which does not replace machinery in such
plants."'
The exemption contains two terms which are not defined
elsewhere in the statute. The key undefined terms are "used
directly" and "manufacturing process." This omission by the
General Assembly has generated substantial litigation by the
Revenue Cabinet and taxpayers in an attempt to define the
terms. The Cabinet has consistently interpreted such terms in a
manner that restricts the availablity of the exemption.
In Schenley Distillers v. Commonwealth ex rel. Luckett,1
4
the taxpayer used a conveyor system to continuously transport
"empty bottles from a loading point to the bottling lines"' 5
where the bottles were filled. The Revenue Cabinet' 6 argued that
the portion of the conveyor system used within the plant ahead
of the processing equipment was not a part of the manufacturing
12 1960 Ky. Acts Ch. 5, art. I, § 47(h), reprinted in Journal of the House of
Representatives of the General Assembly, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Regular Session
of 1960, at 184.
11 1960 Ky. Acts Ch. 5, Art I, § 17, reprinted in Journal of the House of
Representatives of the General Assembly, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Regular Session
of 1960, at 177. See also Department of Revenue v. Spalding Laundry & D.C. Co., 436
S.W.2d 522, 524 (Ky. 1968) (holding that the statute was constitutional under the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because "it [was] peculiarly a
matter of legislative selection, in balancing the public benefits against the tax loss, to
determine what type of industry will best promote the general welfare").
4 467 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1971).
" Id. at 599.
16 The Revenue Cabinet was formerly known as the Department of Revenue.
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process nor a link between essential steps of the manufacturing
process.' 7 The Cabinet's argument was based on Ohio's prece-
dent in General Motors Corp. v. Bowers. 8 In General Motors
Corp., the electrical equipment transformed and transported the
electrical supply within the plant prior to use by the manufac-
turing machinery. 19 The Ohio court decided that the electrical
equipment was not used directly in the manufacturing process
because the equipment was used to transport the electrical supply
to the manufacturing machinery. 20 The electrical equipment would
have qualified for Ohio's exemption if the transportation was a
part of the manufacturing process or between essential steps of
the manufacturing process. 21 The Cabinet's argument was an
attempt to narrowly define the beginning and ending points of
the manufacturing process so that only a small portion of the
total manufacturing activity would be considered an exempt
process. Kentucky's highest court rejected this approach and
adopted New York's integrated plant theory, relying on Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp. v. Wanamaker.
22
In the New York case, the Director of Sales Tax conceded
that the utility's boiler, turbine, and generator were used directly
in the production of electricity. z3 The utility's remaining equip-
ment used to produce electricity was assessed by the Director.
Such equipment included: "the crane and car dumper which
unloaded incoming coal; the conveyor belts which moved it along
toward the boiler; the crushers, sprayers and metal detectors
which process the coal as it moved along the belts, and the slag
lines and pumps and narrow gauge railway which carry the ash
and slag from the boiler."' ' The New York court did not lay
down a bright line test, but held the following inquiries appro-
priate: (1) Is the disputed item necessary to production? (2) How
close, physically and causally, is the disputed item to the finished
product? (3) Does the disputed item operate harmoniously with
" Schenley Distillers, 467 S.W.2d at 599-600.
" 132 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio 1956).
19 Id. at 214.
Id. at 215.
Id.
u 144 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1955).
'3 Id. at 460.
, Id. at 460-61.
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the admittedly exempt machinery to make an integrated and
synchronized system?
25
Utilizing these factors, the New York court held that raw
material handling equipment and waste removal equipment was
used directly in the manufacturing process because all the equip-
ment worked together to produce electricity and one piece of
equipment could not work without the other.
26
Likewise, in Schenley Distillers, the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that the raw material (i.e., empty bottles) handling equip-
ment and the conveyor system were used directly in the manu-
facturing process because the conveyor system was the beginning
of an integrated production process. 27 In doing so, the court
evaluated the business of the taxpayer and determined the be-
ginning and ending points of the integrated production process.
Thus, any equipment physically used in between the beginning
and ending points is used directly in the manufacturing process
and qualifies for the exemption.
Department of Revenue v. Indian Head Mining Co. 28 was
the first case where the court decided that the "processing of
coal following its extraction from the earth" 29 was not "manu-
facturing" for purposes of the sales and use tax exemption for
"new and expanded industry."30 This case was decided under
the original sales and use tax statute.3 ' The court relied heavily
on Colley v. Eastern Coal Corporation,2 which defined "man-
ufacturing" under a statute that exempted machinery used in
manufacturing from local property taxes." In Colley, the court
21 Id. at 461.
26 Id.
27 Schenley Distillers, 467 S.W.2d at 600.
n, 534 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1976).
" Id. at 806.
30 Id.
11 Id. For an explanation of the statute see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
1 470 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1971); overruled, Department of Revenue v. Allied Drum
Service, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Ky. 1978), quoted in Indian Head Mining Co., 534
S.W.2d at 806. (The Kentucky Supreme Court overruled Colley after the Kentucky
General Assembly amended the statute so that the extraction of minerals would qualify
for the exemption. In Allied Drum Serv., the court held that the reconditioning of used
metal drums was "manufacturing" and the equipment acquired to recondition the drums
qualified for the exemption.)
11 Colley, 470 S.W.2d at 340 (citing KRS § 132.200(4)) (1982 Supp. 1986) (KRS §
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of appeals 34 held that the "process [of] . . . removing foreign
matter and impurities" 3 from mine-run coal was not "manu-
facturing. ' 3 6 The court opined that such processes were not
"manufacturing" because "the basic character and kind of ma-
terial processed by [the coal company] remained the same
throughout the process. The substance was coal when it was
extracted from the mine and subjected to the processing, and it
was coal at the conclusion of the processing." 3 7 Similarly, in
Indian Head Mining Co., the court concluded that a wheel
loader used to "clear the overburden from a seam of coal"
38
and used to load the coal into trucks was not used in manufac-
turing process, and therefore the court disallowed the exemp-
tion. 39 The court then challenged the General Assembly to amend
the statute to grant coal mining the exemption, by stating: "If
this result does not comport with the objectives of the statute,
the remedy is a matter of legislation, wherein the limitation
originated. "40
Apparently, the Governor responded to the court's challenge
4'
because the proclamation calling for a special session of the
General Assembly later that year included the following reason
for the special session: "[tlhe amendment of KRS 139.170 to
clarify the fact that the sales tax exemption applicable to 'ma-
chinery for new and expanded industry' applies to machinery
for processing and extracting industries."
'42
132.200(4) exempts from local property taxes "[m]achinery and products in course of
manufacture, of individuals or corporations actually engaged in manufacturing, and
their raw material actually on hand at their plant for the purpose of manufacture."
1, The Kentucky Court of Appeals was the highest court in Kentucky until 1976
when an intermediate appellate court was added to the Kentucky judiciary. Since 1976,
the Kentucky Supreme Court has been the highest court.
11 Colley, 470 S.W.2d at 339.
36 Id.
11 Id. at 340.
11 Indian Head Mining Co., 534 S.W.2d at 805.
19 Id. at 806.
° Id.
' Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly, at 2. Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, Extraordinary Session of 1976; See also Brief for Harbert Construction Corp.
and Star Fire Coals, Inc. at 23, Revenue Cabinet, Com. v. Amax Coal Co., 718 S.W.2d
947 (Ky. 1986).
11 Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly, Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Extraordinary Session of 1976, at 2.
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The General Assembly responded to the Governor's call and
enacted a new statute defining "machinery for new and ex-
panded industry" as follows:
'Machinery for new and expanded industry' shall mean that
machinery used directly in the manufacturing or processing
production process, which is incorporated for the first time
into plant facilities established in this state, and which does
not replace machinery in such plants. The term 'processing
production' shall include: the processing and packaging of raw
materials, in-process materials, and finished products; the
processing and packaging of farm and dairy products for sale;
and the extraction of minerals, ores, coal, clay, stone and
natural gas.43
The amendment changed the interpretation of the term
"manufacturing" in certain significant situations. Prior to the
amendment, the court generally required that a commercially
saleable product be produced from raw materials and that there
be a transformation of the basic character of the substance
involved. 44 After the amendment, the exemption specifically ap-
plied to the extraction of minerals. The Revenue Cabinet now
admits that "the term 'manufacturing process' refers to both
manufacturing and processing production processes ' 45 and also
concedes that the integrated plant theory is the law in Ken-
tucky."
The Revenue Cabinet continued, however, to deny the ex-
emption for certain machinery used by manufacturing and proc-
essing industries, even after the amendment expressed a clear
intent to expand the application of the exemption. Since the
amendment, the Cabinet has taken the position that the inte-
grated plant theory begins and ends when the machinery is "used
directly" in the manufacturing or processing production proc-
,3 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 7, § 1, (Extraordinary Sess.) (emphasis in the original to
denote the amendment by the General Assembly), reprinted in Journal of the Senate of
the General Assembly, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Extraordinary Session of 1976, at
18.
See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
41 Brief for Appellant at 14, Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d 947.
" Id. at 13.
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ess. 47 The Cabinet was correct as the statute requires that the
machinery be "used directly" to qualify for the exemption.
The Cabinet made this argument successfully in Department
of Revenue v. Kuhlman Corp.48 In Kuhlman, the taxpayer used
a computer to perform supervisory and managerial functions
because labor tickets prepared by laborers were inputed to assist
plant personnel in controlling production cycles. 49 The computers
were not used to control or operate the manufacturing machin-
ery. The following quote provides an excellent assessment of
why the court in Kuhlman did not address the "integrated plant"
theory and the "used directly" concept:
Because the computer was so divorced from the manufacturing
process it was unnecessary for the court to determine what
factors it will rely on in deciding whether machinery is used
directly in manufacturing. Thus in holding that the computer
was not 'machinery used directly in the manufacturing process'
the court did not set out a clear test. Instead it simply noted
that the computer did not control any manufacturing machin-
ery nor did it manufacture anything itself.5 0
Although the Cabinet won in Kuhlman, the court did not
explain the relationship between the integrated plant theory and
the statutory concept of "used directly." Apparently, in its zeal
to restrict the application of the exemption, the Cabinet contin-
ued to construe "used directly" narrowly after its victory in
Kuhlman.
11 Id. at 9.
The Cabinet argues that an item may be used within the exempt process,
but not directly used in that process. Unfortunately, courts have tended to
overlook that simple observation in their struggle to define the boundaries
of the exempt process. That oversight has generated enormous problems
for us as tax administrators. Courts have told us that we must ask certain
questions to determine whether an item operates within the exempt process;
but those answers do not tell us if the item is directly used in that process.
It might be indirectly used. We cannot find out unless we ask more
questions. (emphasis in original).
Id.
" 564 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1978).
49 Id. at 15, 16.
o Whiteside and Harman, Kentucky Taxation, 67 Ky. L.J. 749 (1978-79).
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In Ross v. Greene & Webb Lumber Co.,"' the Cabinet once
again raised the issue of "used directly" by denying the exemp-
tion to fifteen items of equipment used in the taxpayer's sawmill
operation.12 The court explained the relationship between the
integrated plant theory and the "used directly" concept, again
quoting from Schenley: "The conveyor system here involved,
from beginning to end, is an integrated part of the production
process and the first movement is as essential as the last. The
machinery is clearly 'used directly in the manufacturing process'
and is tax exempt."
53
The court again expressed the idea that an item of equipment
was "used directly" within the statutory concept if it was essen-
tial to the integrated production process. In Department of
Revenue v. State Contracting & Stone Co.,54 the Cabinet sought
to reinterpret "used directly" so that the exemption would not
apply to items of equipment purchased by the manufacturer to
comply with federal laws and regulations. In State Contracting,
the Cabinet denied the exemption for pollution control equip-
ment and hot-mix storage bins used in an asphalt plant.5 The
court held that the pollution control equipment qualified for the
exemption in a very concise opinion as follows:
It is conceded by the Department of Revenue that the limestone
crusher is directly used in manufacturing the asphalt. This
court is of the view that the pollution control equipment is
indispensable to the operation of the "crusher," which is
directly engaged in manufacturing. The pollution control
equipment is mandated by federal law and regulations. With-
out it, State Stone and Contracting could not operate. There
would of necessity be a cessation of its manufacturing of
asphalt. To hold that the pollution control equipment is not
an essential part of the manufacturing process of asphalt would
thwart the legislative intent of KRS 139.480(8) 'to enhance
Kentucky's competitive position in manufacturing.'
5 6
567 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1978).
" Id. at 303.
13 Id. (quoting Schenley, 467 S.W.2d at 600).
', 572 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1978).
I d. at 422.
16 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Ross, 567 S.W.2d at 304).
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Based on State Contracting, equipment purchased to comply
with a statute or regulation can provide the "essentialness" or
"indispensableness" to the integrated production process needed
to qualify the machinery for the exemption. A prior law review
author made the following comment regarding the necessity fac-
tor used in State Contracting:
If applied in all cases in which taxpayers sought to qualify
purchases under the new and expanded industry exemption, a
strict standard of necessity or indispensability would ostensibly
serve to deny the exclusion to machinery or equipment which,
although immediately engaged in the actual production proc-
ess, was not indispensable to the manufacture of a finished
product. Therefore, equipment purchased to increase produc-
tivity or improve quality control would arguably be denied tax-
exempt status on the grounds that such devices were not es-
sential to the manufacture of a marketable or salable product.
Such a result would significantly restrict the economic impact
of the new and expanded industry exemption, and would be
inconsistent with the legislative intent to promote industrial
efficiency and "enhance Kentucky's competitive position in
manufacturing." A more reasonable interpretation of the court's
opinion would apply this restrictive construction of "used di-
rectly in the manufacturing process" only where equipment or
machinery itself serves no manufacturing function, but is only
peripherally related to the principle production process.
5 7
The Cabinet quoted the first part of this law review article
in its brief to show that the essentialness standard is a more
restrictive test because it would disallow the exemption in cases
where it has previously been allowed (i.e. equipment purchased
to increase production).58 The law review author's opinion that
essentialness should only apply to peripherally or indirectly re-
lated equipment is sensible. This interpretation would further
the legislative intent of the exemption.
The historical development of the exemption from the sales
and use tax for machinery for new and expanded industry has
a long and tortured history. One amendment and numerous
" Vasek & Bradley, Kentucky Taxation, 68 Ky. L.J. 776, 792 (1979-80) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Kuhlman, 572 S.W.2d at 422).
11 Brief for Appellant at 30, Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d 947.
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court cases59 have attempted to determine both the scope of the
exemption and the legislative intent of the General Assembly.
The action or inaction of a legislature in response to the courts'
interpretation of a specific amendment to a statute may be
indicative of the legislative intent6° as the following statement
indicates:
It is a general rule that the intent of the legislature is indicated
by its action, and not by its failure to act. On the other hand,
it has been declared that the silence of the legislature, when it
has authority to speak, may sometimes give rise to an impli-
cation depending on the nature of the legislative power and
the effect of its exercise. Thus, the fact that the legislature has
not seen fit by amendment to express disapproval of a contem-
poraneous or judicial interpretation of a particular statute, has
been considered to bolster such construction of the statute. In
this request, it has been declared that where a judicial construc-
tion has been placed upon the language of a statute for a long
period of time, so that there has been abundant opportunity
for the lawmaking power to give further expression to its will,
the failure to do so amounts to legislative approval and rati-
fication of the construction placed upon the statute by the
courts. These rules are particularly applicable, where the stat-
ute is amended in other particulars. 61
Therefore, the legislative intent of the General Assembly
seems clear after one specific amendment and numerous unan-
swered court cases62 applying the exemption broadly to manu-
facturing and production processing industries. However, the
Cabinet apparently has not been convinced because it has pur-
sued three additional cases to the Kentucky Supreme Court
,9 See, e.g., Schenley Distillers, 467 S.W.2d 598; Department of Revenue v. Spald-
ing Laundry and D.C. Co., 436 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1968); Commonwealth ex. rel. Luckett
v. WLEX-TV, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1968); Indian Heading Mining Co., 534
S.W.2d 805; Department of Revenue ex rel. Luckett v. Allied Drum, 550 S.W.2d 564
(Ky. App. 1977), aff'd, 561 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1978); Ross, 567 S.W.2d 302; State
Contracting, 572 S.W.2d 421; Kuhlman, 564 S.W.2d 14.
w0 See Brief for Harbert Construction Corp. and Star Fire Coals, Inc. at 21, Amax
Coal, 718 S.W.2d 947.
61 Id. (quoting 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 169 (1974)).
62 See supra note 59.
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involving five different coal companies.6 3 These cases were con-
solidated as Amax Coal Co. because similar issues were involved
in each case: all three dealt with the sales tax exemption for
machinery in the coal industry.
II. Revenue Cabinet, Com. v. Amax Coal Company
Revenue Cabinet, Com. v. Amax Coal Co.64 is the Kentucky
Supreme Court's most recent decision dealing with the exemption
for machinery for new and expanded industry. In Amax Coal
Co., the Revenue Cabinet once again raised the issue of whether
machinery was "used directly" in the production process. 65 The
Cabinet interpreted "used directly" as "direct contact" which
means "in direct contact with and without the intervention of
any person or thing." 6 The "direct contact" standard would
require the machinery to physically come "in contact with the
article being produced." 6 7 The Cabinet was asking the court, in
effect, to give "used directly" a much more narrow construction
than it had given the term in any of its prior decisions. The
Cabinet's direct contact standard would have only allowed the
exemption for mining machinery that physically touched the
coal. The Cabinet's interpretation of the term "used directly"
would have disallowed the exemption for a significant portion
of the machinery used in both deep and surface mining. The
exemption was often disallowed because of the way in which the
equipment was used in the mining operation rather than the
nature of the equipment itself. This created significant doubts
as to whether a particular machine would qualify for the ex-
emption. The Cabinet argued that its standard was easy to apply
because mere contact was sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of the statute.
68
The court responded to the Cabinet's question by defining
"used directly" as it had done in its prior decisions. 69 The court
63 The five coal companies were: Amax Coal Co., Gibraltar Coal Corp., H & A
Coal Co., Harbert Construction Corp., and Star Fire Coals, Inc.
- 718 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1986).
61 Id. at 948.
Brief for Appellant at 25, Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d 947.
67 Id. at 26.
6 Id.
69 Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d at 949-50.
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rephrased its analysis of Department of Revenue v. Kuhlman
Corp.,70 Ross v. Greene & Webb Lumber Co. ,7l Schenley Dis-
tillers v. Commonwealth ex. rel. v. Luckett,72 and Department
of Revenue v. State Contracting & Stone Co. 73 and concluded
that machinery that does not touch the coal could be used
directly in the extraction of coal pursuant to the requirement of
the exemption staute.7 4 The court held "that under the integrated
plant concept of Schenley Distilleries machinery used in proce-
dures 'essential to the total process of manufacuring' are used
directly in the manufacturing process .... ,,7s
The court's extended analysis of the meaning of "used di-
rectly" is appropriate in view of the Cabinet's position. Thus,
the court's decision is significant for the coal industry because
the scope of the exemption is sufficiently broadened to include
most mining equipment.
76
Clearly, the court was painting with a broad brush in de-
scribing the machinery which qualified for the exemption. How-
ever, a more thorough examination of the types and uses of
equipment that qualified for the exemption in Amax Coal would
be helpful to tax practitioners and taxpayers in assessing whether
certain equipment qualifies for the exemption.
70 564 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1978). See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
" 567 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1978). See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
71 467 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1971). See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
71 572 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1978). See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
74 Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d at 949-50.
75 Id.
76 The court's opinion described in summary fashion the types and uses of the
machinery which qualified for the exemption. The court's description of the use of the
machinery was limited to the following statements:
In the Amax case, the challenged equipment was to be use for reclamation
of land, which is also mandated by all the familiar federal and state
statutes. The [three complete sets of] batteries are not surplus or extra,
but are required for the scoop to be fully operational. If the scoop and
one set of batteries were exempt, so are the other sets of batteries. With
regard to the roof bolters, since additional coal could not be mined without
support for the 'roof' of previously mined areas, it is clear that the bolter
is an indispensable part of the mining process. Iln Harbert [sic], . . . the
machinery .. .was used for controlling dust, maintenance of coal haul
roads and reclamation....
Id. at 950.
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A. Amax Coal Company
The taxpayer purchased three Caterpillar D-9 tractors for
the purpose of reclaiming the previously mined area in order to
comply with its surface mining permit. 7 Therefore, the regula-
tory requirement to reclaim the mined area provided the "essen-
tialness" to find that the tractors were "used directly" in the
reclamation process within the statutory concept of "extraction
of coal" and under the judicially-created integrated plant the-
ory.7
8
B. Gibraltar Coal Corporation
The taxpayer purchased two Caterpillar D-9 tractors and one
Allis-Chalmers HD41 tractor which were used for building sed-
imentation ponds prior to the extraction process. 79 These tractors
were also used in the extraction and reclamation processes. 80 The
taxpayer also purchased one Euclid Gob Haulage truck to haul
toxic waste materials from the taxpayer's processing plant.8 '
Such processing is often necessary to convert the coal into a
salable product. Under the integrated plant theory the extraction
of coal includes processes conducted at the washer and tipple.
This is a substantial broadening of the application of the ex-
emption because a gob truck does not touch the coal.
C. H & A Coal Company
The taxpayer purchased a roof bolter, two sets of scoop
batteries, and two battery chargers for use in the company's
deep mine. 82 The two sets of scoop batteries and two battery
,7 Amax Coal Co. v. Revenue Cabinet, Com., No. K-8858, slip. op. at 2 (Ky.
B.T.A. 1982), reprinted in Brief for Appellant at appendix B, Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d
947.
71 See Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d at 950.
71 Gibraltar Coal Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet, Com., No. K-8859, at 1-2 (Ky. B.T.A.
1982), reprinted in Brief for Appellant at Appendix B, Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d 947.
Id.
Id. The purchase of a gob haulage truck necessarily infers that the taxpayer had
a coal washer that cleans and processes the coal because a Gob truck is used to haul
the waste material from the coal washer to the disposal site.
11 Brief for H & A Coal Co. at 3, Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d 947. See Amax Coal,
718 S.W.2d at 950.
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chargers were not replacement parts, but they were necessary
for the scoop to remain fully operational because the batteries
had to be recharged after approximately three hours of use. 3
Thus, all three sets of batteries and chargers were necessary to
the mining process and qualified for the exemption.
The roof bolter did not directly contact or touch the coal
and would not have qualified for the exemption under the Ca-
binet's interpretation pre-Amax.8 4 The roof bolter is indirectly
used in the extraction process, but is used directly under the
integrated plant concept because it is essential to provide support
for previously mined area.
85
D. Harbert Construction Company and Star Fire Coals, Inc.
The taxpayer purchased seven types of machinery for use in
its deep and surface mines. 86 First, motor grader's were used to
remove the final layer of overburden, to grade the spoil area as
required by the mining permit, and to maintain haul roads
required by the permt.Y7 The motor graders are used in the
extraction process and to comply with the regulatory require-
ments. The regulatory requirement provides the essentialness to
consider the latter two activities as being used directly within the
integrated mining process
s8
Secondly, water tank trucks were "used to spray haul roads
for the purpose of controlling the fugitive dust . . ."89 which is
required by the mining permit. Again, the regulatory requirement
provides the essentialness for the equipment to be used directly
within the integrated mining process. 90
83 Id.
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
See Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d at 950.
Brief for Harbert Constr. Corp. and Star Fire Coals, Inc. at 7-9, Amax Coal,
718 S.W.2d at 947. See Harbert Constr. Corp. & Star Fire Coals, Inc. v. Revenue
Cabinet, Com., No. K-9083, at 2 (Ky. B.T.A.1982), reprinted in Brief for Appellant at
Appendix D, Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d 947.
87 Id.
88 See Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d at 950.
89 See supra note 86.
'o See supra note 88.
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Third, light plants with towers were "used to illuminate the
work area at night and are required by MSHA. '"9' Again, the
federal regulatory requirement provides the essentialness for the
equipment to be used directly within the integrated mining proc-
ess. 92 Alternatively, the light plant is indispensable to conducting
mining activities at night. The light plant should qualify for the
exemption because it was used directly in the extraction process
or at least was necessary to the extraction process.
Fourth, dusting machines were used to control "float dust"
which is a health and safety hazard in deep mines. 93 Their use
is required by MSHA.94 Again, the regulatory requirement is
sufficient to qualify dusting machines for the exemption. 95
Fifth, roof bolters which were used to support the roof of
the mine qualified for the exemption. Roof bolters were dis-
cussed previously under H & A Coal Co.96
Sixth, a tractor, mechanical spreader, and standard harrow
were used to prepare, fertilize and seed the reclaimed mine areas
as required by the mining permit. Again, the regulatory require-
ment is sufficient to qualify the equipment for the exemption.
97
Finally, a small dragline was used "to maintain silt dams
and ponds" as required by the mining permit. 98 The maintenance
of the silt dams and ponds is an integral part of the company's
reclamation efforts and is essential to the integrated mining
process. 99
This analysis of the types and uses of equipment illustrates
the extensive application of the court's opinion in Amax Coal.
There exist many other types of equipment not discussed here
that are used in the integrated mining process that will qualify
for the exemption.
91 See supra note 86.
92 See supra note 88.
91 See supra note 86.
% Id.
91 See supra note 88.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE EXEMPTION
Machinery must satisfy four statutory requirements to be
eligible for the exemption from sales and use taxes as machinery
for new and expanded industry. First, the machinery must be
"used directly."'0 Secondly, the machinery must be used in a
"manufacturing or processing production process." 10' Third, the
machinery must be "incorporated for the first time into plant
facilities established in this state."10 2 Finally, the machinery must
"not replace machinery in such plants."'0 3 The courts and the
Cabinet have added a certain gloss to each of these requirements.
First, the court in Revenue Cabinet Com. v. Amax Coal
Co.'04 has broadened the concept of "used directly" to include
machinery that is essential or indispensable to an integrated
manufacturing or processing production process.105
Second, the court in defining a manufacturing process has
stated that: "Material having no commercial value for its in-
tended use before processing which has appreciable commercial
value for its intended use after processing by the machinery is
manufacturing."'06 In Indian Head Mining Co., the court held
that coal processing was not manufacturing. 07 Then in 1976, the
General Assembly amended the statute to include processing
production processes within the exemption. 08 Processing pro-
duction processes by statute includes the extraction of coal. In
Amax Coal, the court interpreted extraction of coal to incude
the reclamation process because a coal operator "cannot strip
mine coal without reclaiming the land."1 °9
Third, the machinery must be "incorporated for the first
time into plant facilities established in this state."" 0 Whether




11, Revenue Cabinet Corn. v. Amax Coal Co., 718 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1986).
1o See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
1o6 Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d at 949 (quoting Department of Revenue, ex rel. Luckett
v. Allied Drum Serv., Inc., 561 S.W.2d 323, 325-26 (Ky. 1978).
o See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
'' See supra note 76.
110 See supra note 102.
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machinery is first incorporated into the manufacturing or proc-
essing production process within the state tends to be a factual
issue. The court in Amax Coal did not address this requirement
because it was unnecessary."' However, in H & A Coal Co. v.
Revenue Cabinet, Com., one of the consolidated cases in Amax
Coal, the Board of Tax Appeals did not render a formal finding
of facts."12 The Board of Tax Appeals' factual findings are
generally binding on reviewing courts. " 3 This requirement is
significant where the operator is attempting to qualify used
equipment for the exemption.
Fourth, the machinery must "not replace machinery in such
plants.1" 4 In each of the consolidated cases heard by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court except for H & A Coal Co., the Kentucky
Board of Tax Appeals found as a finding of fact or as a
conclusion of law that the machinery did not replace existing
machinery." 5 The Revenue Cabinet by regulation has further
refined this requirement as follows:
New machinery purchased to replace other machinery in the
plant is subject to tax unless the new machinery performs a
different function, manufactures a different product, or has a
greater productive capacity, measured by units of production,
than the machinery replaced. Modification of machinery to
perform a different function or manufacture a different prod-
uct qualifies for exemption. "1
6
"The Cabinet recognizes information from machinery man-
ufacturers in establishing greater production capacity of new
machinery over that of machinery being replaced." 7 In Gibral-
- In Amax Coal Co. the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals found that the taxpayers
incorporated the machinery into plant facilities. See Amax Coal Co. v. Revenue Cabinet,
Com., No. K-8858, at 2 (Ky. B.T.A. 1982); Gibraltar Coal Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet,
Com., No. K-8859, at 2 (Ky. B.T.A. 1982); Harbert Constr. Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet,
Com., No. K81-R-25, at 1 (Ky. B.T.A. 1982), reprinted in Brief for Appellant at
Appendix B, Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d 947.
,,2 See H & A Coal Co. v. Revenue Cabinet, Com. No. K-6799, at 2 (Ky. B.T.A.
1982).
" See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra note 100.
'" See supra note 111.
, 103 Ky. ADMiN. REGs. 30:120, § 2(4) (1982).
i, Interview with Keith George, Commissioner of the Revenue Cabinet's Depart-
ment of Professional and Support Services (1986), reprinted in D. & P. Knopf, Report
on Meeting by State Tax Committee with Revenue Cabinet, Jan. 1987, at 5.
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tar Coal Corp. v. Revenue Cabinet, Corn.,118 one of the consol-
idated cases in Amax Coal Co., the Kentucky Board of Tax
Appeals held as a conclusion of law that a Caterpillar D-9H
Tractor used to remove overburden was replacement equipment
which "provided a greater production capacity than the equip-
ment and machinery it replaced .... ,,9 The D-9H Tractor qual-
ified for the exemption. Note that the statute provides that
replacement machinery does not qualify for the exemption, but
improved replacement machinery will qualify under the Cabinet's
administrative regulations and under the Kentucky Board of Tax
Appeals decisions. Thus, with appropriate planning most equip-
ment purchased by the coal industry can satisfy the fourth
requirement.
In Amax Coal Co., the Supreme Court did not examine
whether any of the machinery met the third or fourth require-
ment. The court was following a basic principle of administrative
law:
If the findings of fact of an administrative agency are sup-
ported by substantial evidence of probative value, they must
be accepted as binding upon the reviewing court, and then it
must be determined whether or not the agency applied the
correct rule of law to the facts so found. It requires no citation
of authority to point out that upon appeal from an adminis-
trative agency, charged with the duty of fact finding, that a
reviewing court is not free to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency unless the latter acted in an arbitrary or capri-
cious manner.
120
The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate the importance of
proving the facts regarding the last two requirements at the
administrative level. This section also illustrates the relationship
of the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals to the Kentucky Supreme
Court in reviewing tax appeals. Furthermore, this section dis-
"I Gibraltar Coal Corp. v. Revenue, Com., No. K-8859 (Ky. B.T.A. 1982), re-
printed in Brief for Appellant at Appendix B, Amax Coal, 718 S.W.2d, 947.
Id. slip op. at 2.
Piper v. Singer Co., 663 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Ky. App. 1984), quoted in Amax
Coal Co. v. Revenue Cabinet, Com., No. 84-CA-1038-MR, at 8 (Ky. App. 1985)
(citations omitted).
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cusses how Amax Coal interacts with the exemption's statutory
framework.
CONCLUSION
Revenue Cabinet Com. v. the Amax Coal Co.' 21 case is a'
juncture in the sales and use tax area because, prior to this
decision, the exemption for machinery for new and expanded
industry had limited utility. The exemption was available only
for machinery that actually touched the coal during the extrac-
tion process. Now, the exemption is available for most mining
equipment that is used in an integrated mining process in Ken-
tucky and that does not replace equipment with the same pro-
ductive capacity. This decision is consistent with the legislative
history of the exemption and implements the General Assembly's
intent to enhance Kentucky's competitive position in the extrac-
tion of coal.
Kipley J. McNally, CPA
.2- 718 S.W.2d 947 (Ky. 1986).
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